Deepfake fraud exercises should test how leaders independently verify urgent payment, access and information requests—even when the request appears to come from a trusted executive or supplier.
Recreate the pressure, not the spectacle
An effective exercise may begin with an unexpected collaboration invitation, a plausible supplier note or a video call claiming that a payment must be made today. The important cues are request context, changed bank details, unusual channels and pressure to bypass controls.
The scenario should not depend on whether someone can visually identify a deepfake. Synthetic media quality changes quickly; independent confirmation through a known, trusted process is more durable.
Test the control handoffs
Ask who can pause a payment, who has verified supplier account details, and how a disputed instruction reaches fraud, treasury, security and leadership. Include a second-stage inject where an employee already acted.
The test then becomes response and containment: can the organisation escalate without blame, involve the right owners and act with incomplete evidence?
Turn the scenario into everyday habits
Provide concise, role-specific job aids for finance, procurement, executive assistants and leaders. Rehearse changed banking instructions and unsolicited requests for credentials, access or information.
A robust lesson is simple: familiarity is not verification. A culture that makes it acceptable to question an apparently senior person is a powerful control against both conventional and AI-enabled fraud.
Four actions to take away
- Validate requests using independent channels
- Keep payment-change controls explicit
- Include executive assistants and finance
- Practise recovery after an error
Further reading & sources
These authoritative references provide additional technical, regulatory or security context. The analysis and recommendations above are original editorial commentary.